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Z-GRAM 62 
College of Naval Warfare Report 
Edited by Captain Marvin C. Scoggins, U.S. Navy 
Forum Member 
Introduction. For about 200 years the Navy has taken the product of our 
society wherever it has found him and trained him to become the type of 
individual required at that precise moment of time. There has been no 
change in that fundamental process today, but a change has occurred in the 
product of our society and it has been dramatic. 
We believe that the needs of our Navy remain essentially stable. The 
challenge is to find unique ways to entice, train, and retain this new indi-
vidual in the Navy. We must keep those traditions that inspire the commander 
to "lay his ship alongside that of the enemy, II and we must foster the loyalty 
and standards which will ensure that the commander be followed. We are 
convinced that an experienced commander, allowed to exact the proper discipline 
and respect, will perform in a manner to "serve in the best interests of the 
United States." 
Recognizing the direction which you have suggested the Navy must go to 
attract and retain capable personnel, we believe that the effectiveness of the 
Z-gram program must be thought of as a total program rather than individual 
actions. Within this context we feel that it has: 
I Projected a change in the overall image of the U.S. Navy from both 
a military and civilian viewpoint. Traditionally viewed as a conservative 
organization, the program has conveyed a new spirit of flexibility, modern 
awareness, and a concern for the individual. 
I Convinced intermediate commanders that they cannot institute de facto 
resistance to changes which are deemed beneficial to the Navy as a whole. 
I Allowed servicewide participation, regardless of rank or rate, in a 
program from which all have been able to realize relatively "instant response." 
While conceding the relative success of the program, the opinions of the 
students of the College of Naval Warfare range from strong concurrence, based 
on an awareness for the necessity of using such tactics, to concern about the 
long-range effects of such a course of action. Nearly all concur that most 
individual actions were long overdue, and many were amazed that they had not 
been previously implemented Navy-wide after seeing them successfully used by 
their respective individual commands. No matter what the initial opinion, 
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there seems to be concern about the effect on future discipline, the integrity 
of the chain of command, and the authority of the individual commanders. 
Two specific areas of concern appear prevalent: First, the backing that 
will be received if the commander is maligned by seniors or criticized by 
juniors while honestly attempting to carry out the spirit of directives; and 
second, the methods and caliber of personnel used to monitor compliance with 
directives. 
We recommend that every effort be made to reemphasize the desirability of 
implementing policy and recommending change through the chain of command. We 
believe that the Z-gram should now be used more selectively and in instances 
where the commanders and overall bureaucracy fail to be responsive. The 
integrity of the chain of command is basic if we are to motivate junior officers 
to seek command. The most potent influence regarding command appeal perceived 
by junior officers is the image of the commanding officer. Commanding officers 
who can communicate and demonstrate to juniors the merits of achieving command 
perform the fundamental service of winning the junior officers' loyalty and 
whetting their ambitions. In order for the commanding officer to successfully 
play his role in this process, it is necessary for him to believe that his 
billet is a rewarding one wherein he enjoys the trust and confidence of his 
seniors. Basically, we are saying that command cannot be enhanced, it is 
self-enhancing; it cannot be given as a reward, it is self-rewarding. 
The goal should be to identify and solve problems associated with reward, 
authority, price, and prestige. This will enhance the entire naval profession, 
including that facet we describe as command. Recognizing the fundamental 
concerns of reward, authority, pride, and prestige, our forum identified the 
three basic problem areas of motivation, ov~~ctuning, and human nacto~ as 
deserving your attention. The remainder of this presentation will expand on 
these factors. 
Motivation. The first of the problems identified under motivation is the 
need to take necessary steps to improve the Navy image in the eyes of the American 
public, especially in the eyes of such opinion molders as the academic community 
and the news media. Our suggestions to achieve this are: 
I Continue emphasis on efforts to further eliminate unnecessary regimen-
tation and abrasive regulations, and gain widespread publicity for these efforts. 
I Capitalize on the Navy's deterrent role of protecting vital economic 
life-lines rather than waging war in inhabited land areas. 
I Endeavor to develop additional new recruiting appeals analogous to 
"Join the Navy and see the world," which are responsive to contemporary values. 
I Increase the Navy's community relations efforts within the United States 
along the lines of the overseas "people to people program." 
I Emphasize the Navy's role in civic action programs and humanitarian 
assistance efforts. 
I Impress upon U.S. Congressmen that to achieve a~ all-volunteer force 
they must affirmatively assist in projecting a favorable image of the Armed 
Forces and, further, should allow the military to utilize commercial adver-
tising to the fullest advantage in competing with civilian employers. 
Another area of concern under the broad area of motivation is what we 
call "the command syndrome." That is, the conviction that an officer must 
have command in order to succeed and, stemming from that, the pursuit of and 
assignment of officers to command billets who are not truly best qualified. 
Our recommendations here include: 
I Recognize command as a somewhat more narrow specialty than is presently 
the case. Establish a formal set of rigorous qualifications which must be 
attained prior to assignment to a command; formally recognize attainment of 
command qualification irrespective of whether an officer is actually assigned 
to command. 
I Assign the limited number of commands available only to those who are 
best qualified and strongly desire such an assignment. Personal image and 
aptitude in interpersonal relations with subordinates should stand very high 
in determining which among those highly qualified should actually be assigned 
to command. 
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I Reward officers exercising command but do not permit these rewards 
to carryover after completion of the command tour. 
I Establish other specialties, at least some of which require formal 
qualification and which lead to successful officer careers. Require the 
same degree of formality and selectivity in screening for key assignments 
in these fields as is required for command (i.e., set up equivalent screening 
boards and have some of these boards convene before command screening boards 
meet in order to stress the importance of other specialties). 
I Prove through selection board results -- directed if necessary -- that 
alternative specialties do offer viable roads to success to the same degree as 
does command. 
The third problem under the overall heading of motivation is that of the 
"second-term concept" whereby a hierarchy of specialties exists for a given 
rank. Examples of this are nuclear submarines having greater prestige than 
diesels, destroyers than amphibs, attack aviation more prestige than anti-
submarine warfare aviation, and anything that flies or floats having more 
prestige than anything that does not. 
Our recommendations in this area are: 
I Select senior officers for major command or other key assignment on 
the basis of past performance and irrespective of specialties except in those 
few instances where previous specialized experience is vital to successful 
performance in the particular assignment. 
I Make every effort to break down the hierarchy of status among commands 
and specialties so that for a given rank all officers are considered equal 
regardless of specialization. 
I Assure that all specialties are proportionally represented in the 
detailing community and on selection boards, both in numbers and in level of 
responsibili ty • 
Another problem is that of officers being assigned to meaningless billets 
which lack challenge, opportunity for initiative or innovation, or which simply 
are not full-time jobs. To ameliorate this we suggest realistically and 
objectively reevaluating every officer billet to determine, first, its 
essentiality and second, whether the responsibility coincides with the rank 
assigned. Theoretically, at least, each billet would thereafter be 
indispensable to the Navy and thus equally important, regardless of position. 
In addition, junior officers could then occupy billets where the responsibility 
is fully commensurate with their rank. Implementation of this recommendation 
would cause the officer rank structure of the Navy to be decreased in size 
with a widening of the base of the pyramid and narrowing at the top. 
Another concern regarding motivation is the problem of the passed-over 
officer and enlisted man who have stagnated in grade, both of whom project a 
poor image to their subordinates and to all others -- in or out of the Navy --
with whom they come in contact. Our recommendation for this situation is to 
ohain legislation providing for prompt separation or retirement -- with equitable 
compensation -- of officers who have twice failed selection for promotion. 
Similarly, enlisted personnel who do not meet a specified promotion timetable 
should not be allowed to reenlist, and chief petty officers should be carefully 
screened for continuation at regular intervals. 
We also recommend adequately rewarding outstanding petty officers. Here 
we have two suggestions: first, institute a "spot promotion" system for 
enlisted personnel below first class (those filling critical billets which 
call for a higher rate); and secondly, significantly lower the time-in-grade 
requirements for outstanding first class petty officer eligibility to take 
the CPO examination. Include a small but significant percentage of such 
petty officers in each advancement group. 
Overstructuring. In the broad category of overstructuring we have 
identified two specific problems. First, the mission, organization, and 
functions of naval staffs should be reexamined. Secondly, we must consider 
the issue of individual exercise of authority and delegation of responsibility. 
To more effectively use our available personnel assets, consideration 
should be given to either reorganizing or completely eliminating some of the 
4. 
operational and administrative staffs found throughout the Naval Establish-
ment. Close examination of mission assignments, internal organization, and 
demonstrated performance would probably reveal that a number of these staffs 
are ~neffectually organized, overpopulated; have overlapping responsibilities; 
and frequently create as many problems as they resolve. Redundancy of effort, 
staffing with quantity rather than concentration on quality of personnel, over-
supervision of and ineffectual support to operating fleet units are typical 
examples of staff shortcomings. Career enhancement is questionable. A 
frequent complaint of junior officers in the surface Navy is that staff duty 
is less desirable than a regular shipboard billet due to the lack of direction 
or responsibility associated with staff assignments. 
Overlapping of reporting requirements exists at many levels. For example, 
a sur£ace ship commanding officer is the first link in an administrative chain 
of command up through his type commander. However, he generally experiences a 
completely different but frequently repetitive reporting procedure for both 
administrative and operational matters when underway. 
As a result of our discussions in this area, the forum recommends that all 
existing naval staffs be reexamined for realistic mission assignments and 
personnel requirements. Whenever and wherever expedient, suspect staffs should 
be reorganized or "deactivated" and officer and enlisted personnel be reassigned 
to more productive and challenging billets. 
Regarding the problem of proper exercise of authority and delegation of 
responsibility, a multitude of routine administrative decisions are being made 
at levels far surpassing the importance of the issues in question. Surface 
commanding officers are often told not only what to do, but are provided with 
excessive guidance on how to do it. When embarked aboard ship, the commanding 
officer of an aviation squadron frequently assumes the unofficial but demeaning 
role of division officer in the ship's organization. 
Thus, in both situations, the commanding officer's freedom to exercise 
personal initiative is restricted, his leadership talent is stifled, and his 
overall command image is degraded in the eyes of his impressionable subordinates. 
The commander must have the complete trust and confidence of his superiors. 
The commanding officer's position is greatly enhanced if his personnel observe 
full support, not oversupervision, from successive links in the chain of command. 
We recommend that strong, clear guidelines be promulgated which would allow 
commanding officers to truly exercise command through more freedom, flexibility, 
control of resources, and sincere self-expression. Commanding officers, in 
turn, should provide similar latitude and decisionmaking authority to responsible 
junior officers and petty officers within their own organizations. 
Human Factors. In order to properly equip our personnel to deal with 
people, it is recommended that applicable and relevant short courses of 
behavioral science training be instituted at all officer indoctrination schools, 
enlisted leadership courses, and advanced officer schools. Further, we believe 
that individuals in the enlisted grades are rarely apprised of their performance 
in a meaningful way. In most instances the enlisted man does not know why, or 
even if he is progressing, and the evaluator feels little responsibility to 
justify his markings. It is recommended that there be established a require-
ment to discuss enlisted evaluations with individuals much in the same manner 
as has recently been applied to officer fitness reports. 
Next on our list of human factors is excessive use of the "can do" spirit 
which we believe is most destructive to human resources. "Can do" is a natural 
tendency-- born of pride and tradition -- but it may also result from fear of 
an unfavorable evaluation and result in compulsive acceptance of commitments 
in excess of resources. It is recommended that: 
First, there be an intensification of realistic efforts at the highest 
level to balance Navy commitments with resources; 
Second, the OPNAV level stress to all lower echelon decisionmakers the 
importance of carefully weighing the resources available, maximizing rest and 
rehabilitation between commitments; 
Third, insist upon factual reporting of readiness -- allot realistic 
resources of time, money, and technical assistance. 
Another human factor problem is unpredictable training and career patterns 
of naval officers. If we are to enhance a professional career in the Navy, 
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motivate younger officers, and develop competent middle-grade officers, each 
must know how to chart his course, receive opportunity based on his individual 
ability, and be assured of the stability of the system in which he places his 
confidence. It is therefore recommended that there be established: 
.; A stable and predictable pattern of opportunity for all specialties of 
which operational command is but one of many • 
.; A systematic professional education program which will provide inter-
mediate goals and equal opportunity to perform • 
.; Prerequisite requirements for officers during the formative years, 
ensuring that unsubstantiated elite groups by deep selection prior to the 
rank of commander are not created . 
.; A system for lineal seniority rearrangement of all ranks which would 
preserve the year group stability but would recognize the relative ability of 
the individuals • 
.; Adequate tools for the selection process and elimination of those which 
fail to properly evaluate the individual and which provide no usable data from 
the considerable effort expended by the boards. 
Another human factor problem which we considered is the security of the 
family, an area that we believe is detrimental to motivating or encouraging 
young people to seek a naval career. In an effort to achieve a proper response 
to individual needs, the following recommendations are considered vital. 
I Establish geographic stability for those who desire it, a "superhome 
port" concept, to allow prolonged home ownership, stability of children's 
education, and the feeling of being a normal community member • 
.; Devise alternate incentives for those who do not desire to live in 
public quarters, BOQ's, or BEQ's. Alternatives might be provided in terms 
such as additional obligated service in exchange for payment subsidy and low 
interest home loans or providing basic allowance for quarters to all single 
personnel. 
I Provide meaningful services and advantages for using commissaries and 
exchanges or reduce them to essentially ships stores carrying only staple items 
or eliminate them completely and provide compensatory pay increases • 
.; Develop a cost of living allowance for all duty stations in the United States • 
.; Develop a realistic temporary living allowance to properly compensate for 
the additional costs always inherent during a move. 
I Provide compensatory time for at-sea periods out of home port but no~ 
deployed, such compensatory time to be scheduled by operational commanders 
in addition to normal required in-port, upkeep time • 
.; Continue efforts for adequate monetary compensation, particularly for 
adjustments in the lower grades. 
Conclusion. Our major finding is that while we have lived with these 
problems for some time, they have been further aggravated by the times we live 
in, and the stage has been reached when constructive steps must be taken by 
those in authority. We believe it is important to remember that no matter how 
inspired, enlightened, and clearly presented a program or policy may be, if it 
involves change in a large organization there are still ways to sabotage it --
whether deliberate or not. Thus, it is vital that CNO expend as much effort to 
ensure proper execution and monitoring of any program as in developing the 
substance of the program itself. 
A striking example of what this forum considers to be a misguided process 
is to be found in one of the means used to implement the equal opportunity and 
other programs. Specifically, we feel that it is wrong to permit a number of 
young enlisted men -- at least some of whom are non-rated -- to roam throughout 
the establishment and reporting with authority upon matters for which they have 
no responsibility. 
In short, we agree it is time to "get with the program" and in a manner 
which demonstrates loyalty and responsibility, listening not only to the com-
plainers and malcontents, but also to dedicated career men. 
LETTER TO THE EDITOR 
LCDR V. S. Mazzola, USN 
BA-2102 
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Professor Senger's comments comparing NPS students to those in civilian 
institutes of higher learning printed in the 4 October issue of The Barometer 
were, in my opinion, of significant value to each of us as Naval-officers. 
We all must, sooner or later, leave the insulated atmosphere of the 
classroom and once again face the problems found in the real world of men and 
machines. Who are the men who will be running the machines? None other than 
the "civilian students" Professor Senger refers to as "more aware and sophisticated 
in areas such as politics and economics than are officer students." If you haven't 
had to face a rap session involving J.O.'s or college trained junior enlisted 
personnel, stand by, because chances are you will find yourself in that situation 
sometime during your next tour. I base this on recent experience as Admin 
Officer of a large combat replacement training squadron. 
You may not have an opportunity to become an expert in political science 
or economics but would not it possibly be of benefit to have some basic under-
standing of the principles involved? John Paul Jones had some ideas about this 
when he set forth his requirement that a Naval Officer must not only be a capable 
mariner but also a gentleman of refined manners and liberal education. 
It therefore follows that it is important for the naval leader to have a 
sound basic knowledge of what motivates his men. Physicists apparently have 
encountered a similar dilemma if an article appearing in the March 70 issue of 
Physics Today is any indication. Titled "Physics and Antiphysics" authored by 
Dr. Adolph Baker, professor of physics at Lowell Technological Institute, Mass., 
it treats the problem of "how do we show those students who believe physics to 
be a force only for evil that physicists care about real world problems?" If the 
youth culture believes that about physics, how do you suppose they feel about 
the U.S. military establishment: A few of Professor Baker's observations are 
enumerated to give some insight to the parallel problems faced by physicists and 
career Naval Officers in the field. "We have long contended with boredom; 
recently something new has been added: rejection. What was once mere disinterest 
has somehow been promoted to a cause • • • it looks as if we may have to go out 
and sell the product, as everybody does." Sound familiar? "Our youth culture 
contains a very loose alliance of opposites, a strange combination of withdrawal 
from society on one hand and violent political struggle on the other. • •• It 
may turn out that the responses of young people today arp a good dc~l healthier 
than the society that produced them. But what is of concern to the scientific 
community [also to the Navy] and what we must come to grips with, are those 
aspects of the new wave that distrust and reject the very processes of reasoning 
and rational discourse. This type of antiscience is in the air we breathe today." 
Professor Baker goes on to quote Paul Goodman, educator and author of 
Growing ~ Absurd, who refers to the antirational trend as a new religion on the 
upswing. "Dissident young people are saying that science is antilife, it is a 
Calvinist obsession • • • and scientific technology has become manifestly 
diabolical." What are the same young people saying about the military? Are 
some of their thoughts valid? If not, do you know the right answers in language 
that they understand? 
These are the people and thoughts you will meet again (or possibly for the 
first time). Do you feel your educational experience here at NPS has prepared you 
for this eventuality? Do you feel that a few up to date directed humanities 
courses should be included in your curriculum? If you haven't thought about 
these sorts of questions it is understandable in the sheltered atmosphere such 
as we enjoy here at NPS. There is no question that NPS is a top notch school 
for engineering and that the emphasis will remain in that area for some time to 
come, but the question must be asked one more time. What is the ~ important 
function of a Naval Officer? Is it leadership or is it technical competency? 
And the beat goes on • • • • . • 
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LETTER TO THE EDITOR 
LCDR Richard D. Haskell, USN 
Re: "Need for a New Gymnasium" from LT C. H. Spikes 
In your haste to reprimand LT Spikes for his rather emotional appeal for 
improved athletic facilities, you ignored the very real issue which he posed. 
The real question is that of priorities and (perhaps even more basically) 
politics. 
Given that both the new library and a new gymnasium are required for this 
"type of command to fulfill its mission," and assuming budget constraints 
prohibited the construction of both, what was the basis for the decision to 
build the library in preference to the gymnasium? My first guess is that it was 
closely related to the golf course expansion, although that is admittedly 
speculation. 
Since it appears on the surface that such a decision was made, LT Spikes 
was certainly justified in questioning the decision that an underused library 
requires replacement more than an overused gymnasium. This question was not 
answered in the Barometer. 
I would suggest that the privilege of the editorial "last word" be exercised 
with great reluctance, and then only in cases where the editor, by virtue of 
training and experience, can be classified as an expert. I believe such restraint 
will result in more nearly realizing the stated objectives of the Barometer. 
LETTER TO THE EDITOR 
Dear Commander Loftus, 
A couple of students suggested that I contact you regarding a notice in the 
Barometer concerning the appointment barber shop. 
Because of the shop being located in an area not heavily frequented, I am 
sure there are many students not aware of its existence. 
It is certainly a definite advantage to be able to get a haircut by appoint-
ment and not have to wait in line. The price is the same. 
The appointment barber shop is open to all students and faculty. It is 
located on the second floor of Herrmann Hall, in the east wing, Room 218. The 
hours are 0830 to 1630. Closed 11:30 to 12:30 for lunch. Phone 2695. 
If it were possible to run such a notice periodically in a publication such 
as yours it would be mutually beneficial to the shop and to the student. Thank you. 
EDITORIAL COMMENT 
Yours sincerely, 
/s/ Joseph C. Noel 
Appointment Barber Shop 
Herrmann Hall, Room E2l8 
Phone 2695 
Note this letter opens this barber shop to all students, regardless of rank. 
